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ABSTRACT
This dissertation's focus is control systems controlled by multiple controllers, each having
its own objective function. The control of such systems is important in many practical applications
such as economic systems, the smart grid, military systems, robotic systems, and others. To reap
the benefits of feedback, we consider and discuss the advantages of implementing both the Nash
and the Leader-Follower Stackelberg controls in a closed-loop form. However, closed-loop
controls require continuous measurements of the system’s state vector, which may be expensive
or even impossible in many cases. As an alternative, we consider a sampled closed -loop
implementation. Such an implementation requires only the state vector measurements at prespecified instants of time and hence is much more practical and co st-effective compared to the
continuous closed-loop implementation. The necessary conditions for existence of such controls
are derived for the general linear-quadratic system, and the solutions developed for the Nash and
Stackelberg controls in detail for the scalar case.
To illustrate the results, an example of a control system with two controllers and state
measurements available at integer multiples of 10% of the total control interval is presented. While
both Nash and Stackelberg are important approaches to develop the controls, we then considered
the advantages of the Leader-Follower Stackelberg strategy. This strategy is appropriate for control
systems controlled by two independent controllers whose roles and objectives in terms of the
system's performance and implementation of the controls are generally different. In such systems,
one controller has an advantage over the other in that it has the capability of designing and
implementing its control first, before the other controller. With such a control hierarchy, this
controller is designated as the leader while the other is the follower. To take advantage of its

primary role, the leader's control is designed by anticipating and considering the follower’s control.
The follower becomes the sole controller in the system after the leader’s control has been
implemented. In this study, we describe such systems and derive in detail the controls of both the
leader and follower. In systems where the roles of leader and follower are negotiated, it is important
to consider each controller's leadership property. This property considers the question for each
controller as to whether it is preferable to be a leader and let the other controller be a follower or
be a follower and let the other controller be the leader. In this dissertation, we try to answer this
question by considering two models, one static and the other dynamic, and illustrating the results
with an example in each case. The final chapter of the dissertation considers an application in
microeconomics. We consider a dynamic duopoly problem, and we derive the necessary
conditions for the Stackelberg solution with one firm as a leader controlling the price in the market.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation considers the important properties and applications of multi-controller
multi-objective systems. These systems fall in the general framework of differential noncooperative non-zero-sum systems. In this chapter, we review these systems' general background,
which will be important for the remaining chapters of this dissertation.
Many control engineering, economic, biological, and social science applications can be
represented and modeled by simple ordinary differential equations. These control systems have
been extensively studied for the past several decades [1-10]. In these systems, state variables are
represented by functions of time and affected by the input parameters and if any external signals,
such as disturbance signals. One of the main demands of such systems is to be stable because the
output changes are bounded as the inputs are bounded. From another view, for stable or stabilized
systems, some systems need to have better behaviors in the time domain. Examples of such
enhancing systems characteristics include fast-reaching to steady-state and decreasing or
eliminating the overshooting. The classical control theory tries to solve such a problem for singleinput-single-output. However, for more general systems with higher-order, the problem is more
complex. The use of the optimization theory to solve such systems with constructing the desired
characteristics with efficient control signal by mathematically represent what is known as
performance index or objective function. This construct problem is called the optimal control
problem.
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Arising from the systems discussed above are have a single input, and single output and
system are controlled by only one controller. Classical and advanced control approaches can
design this controller; the controller is designed by applying optimal control theory tools.
However, the systems with single input are well defined for such the principle of optimality, and
it is clear and straight forward for many applications. For example, tools are applied for designing
a closed-loop controller for linear systems and single quadratic objective function, which is wellknown as LQ systems. On the other hand, many applications cannot be controlled by one
controller. Thus, no one of the controllers can govern the system's behavior by itself, and neither
can be the only minimizer for its objective. In other words, the controller must consider the other
controllers’ syntheses over the time horizon, finite or infinite. The latter makes the problem more
complex for such systems, i.e., the multiple controllers with multiple objectives, even for the
simple open-loop systems. The application of the principle of optimality is not clear in these
systems. However, such systems' design is strategic and based on the method in which all
controllers have committed. From focusing on the work done in this research dissertation, these
strategies (or solutions) could be done simultaneously or in a hierarchical approach. The next
sections will consider the optimal control problem framework and the multiple -controller
framework as well.
1.1 Single-Controller with Single objective problems (Optimal control problems):
This problem is based on the fact that there is one controller that governs the system’s dynamics,
and thus this controller will be the optimizer (usually the minimizer) for its objective function.
Thus, choosing a controller should result in the best value for its objective, in the sense its value

2

is the lowest value among all the other possible controller choices. In mathematical representation,
the optimal control problems for the ordinary differential equation, such as the system’s states ,
evolving over time-horizon , t f can be finite or infinite.
The state differential equation is
x(t ) = f (t , x(t ), u (t ))

x(0) = xo , t  [to , t f ]

(1.1)

If the controller is chosen from the admissible control strategy, i.e. u(t )  . In the open-loop
design, the controller synthesis provided the initial state values xo . For a closed-loop design
approach, continuous information x(t ) has to be available at each instance of time. For both open/
closed-loop approaches, the designed controller role as the minimizer for its objective functions:
J = S (t f , x(t f )) +  L( , x( ), u ( ))d
tf

to

Where the S (t f , x(t f )) is the terminal cost and the L

(1.2)

is the local ( or called running) cost.

Many approaches have been invested in finding solutions, control designs, and optimal control
problems. The next section includes a background introduction for the multi-controller multiobjective systems framework based on the two main approaches: Nash and leader-follower
Stackelberg approaches.
1.2 Control Systems with Multi-Controller with Multi-Objectives
Control systems whose state variables are controlled by two or more independent
controllers, each trying to optimize the system performance based on its own criterion , occur in
many applications such as in transportation systems [11-17], robotics [18-26], biomedical systems
3

[27-36], economic systems [37-47], power systems [48-59], smart energy buildings [60-65],
military systems [66-71], and many other applications for in networks. The applications example
of such network systems is unmanned underwater vehicles and satellites[72-76] in different
context. In work in [72] focuses on team cooperation, namely consensus, for both leaderless (LL)
and modified leader-follower (MLF) architectures. The recent papers are application of multiplecontroller on cyber-physical systems [77-82], to mention a few.
Unlike the classical one controller control systems where the sequence of control
implementation is not an issue, control systems with more than one controller have the additional
complexity of designating whether the control actions are implemented simultaneously at the same
time or whether there is a sequence by which the controls are implemented. The Nash approach
[83], first introduced to the control literature in [84, 85], describes a situation where the control
actions are implemented simultaneously and exactly at the same time. Thus, no one controller has
an advantage over the other in knowing ahead of time how the other controller reacts to its control
actions. Such an approach may result in an equilibrium that prohibits each controller from
deviating from its control actions; simply because if such a deviation is taken , the outcome will be
unfavorable to the controller exercising such an action. Another approach, known as the
Stackelberg approach [86], first introduced into the control literature in [87, 88], describes a
situation where one controller is more powerful than the other resulting in the control actions
implemented according to a specific hierarchical sequence. The more powerful controller
implements its control first and is assigned as the leader, and the other controller is then set as the
follower. Such a hierarchy of decision making was first introduced in the 1950’s by Von
Stackelberg[86] in the context of two firms making decisions about supplying a product into a
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common market. The more powerful firm, which was labeled as the “leader”, decided on its
production level first and the less powerful firm, which was labeled as the “follower”, followed by
making its decision after knowing the production level of the leader firm. Since then, there has
been considerable interest in the control literature in this hierarchical control structure for control
systems with two controllers. [89, 90] Assuming that each controller has its own objective function
that it wants to optimize, the question is how would the leader controller design its control so that
when the follower controller follows, the final outcome will be favorable to the leader? This
question is very important to address whenever such a hierarchy in control design exists.
1.3 Nash Control Solution
The Nash rational in control has been studied by many researchers over the past fifty years
or so [84, 85]. This type of multiple controller strategy has the property that no one controller will
benefit by deviating from its agreed Nash control. The optimality is defined by assuming that both
controllers know each other objective functions during their control design determination, and they
are designed and implemented simultaneously.
Suppose the objective function of controller 1 is J1 ( u1 , u2 ) , and the objective function of
controller 2 is J 2 ( u1 , u2 ) where u1 and u2 are the respective control functions of the two controllers
and U1 U 2 are the domains of these controls. The symbolical representation for deriving the Nash
controls are as follows:
u1* = min J1 ( u1 , u2* )

(1.1)

u2* = min J 2 ( u1* , u2 )

(1.2)

u1U1

u 2 U 2

Thus, both above equations yield to the Nash strategy inequality
5

J1 ( u1* , u2* )  J1 ( u1 , u2* )

J 2 ( u1* , u2* )  J 2 ( u1* , u2 )

(1.3)
(1.4)

These inequalities assure each controller that the other controller has no incentive to deviate
from its Nah control because if it does, it will only be hurting its own objective function. In this
sense, the Nash controls provide an equilibrium situation for both controllers.
The necessary condition for the Nash open-loop solutions for both controllers is illustrated
in the following
1.3.1 Nash Open-Loop Solution in Dynamic Systems

Consider two controllers C1 and C2 , responsible for finding the controls u1 and u 2 ,
respectively, in which these control variables are continuous functions on the interval t0 , t f  . The
two-controller differential system with state equation
x = f ( x, u1 , u2 , t ) ,

x ( t0 ) = x0

(1.5)

and controller 1 has its own objective function

(

J1 ( u1 , u2 ) = K1 x ( t f

)) + 

tf

t0

L1 ( x, u1 , u2 , t ) dt

(1.6)

and for controller 2 the objective function is

(

J 2 ( u1 , u2 ) = K 2 x ( t f

)) + 

tf

t0

L2 ( x, u1 , u2 , t ) dt

(1.7)

Where x0 is the initial state known by both controllers, and, u1  U1 and u2  U 2 t  t0 , t f  ,
where t0 , t f  is the fixed time-horizon.
Depending on the structure of the information for both controllers, such as open-loop structure.
Hence, the controls depend on the time and initial state x0 , u1 = u1 ( t , x0 ) and u2 = u2 ( t , x0 )
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To derive the necessary condition for such systems implementing their controls using the Nash
strategy, both act simultaneously. In other words, C1 picks u1 and C2 picks u 2 , at the same time.
Where the pair ( u1 , u2 )  U1  U 2 .
The Hamiltonian function for C1 and C2 are as follow:
H1 ( x, u1 , u2 , 1 , t ) = L1 ( x, u1 , u2 , t ) + 1 f ( x, u1 , u2 )

(1.8)

H 2 ( x, u1 , u2 , 2 , t ) = L2 ( x, u1 , u2 , t ) + 2 f ( x, u1 , u2 )

(1.9)

Where 1 = 1 ( t ) and 2 = 2 ( t ) are costate variables for C1 and .Thus, the necessary conditions
for C1 and C2 are addressed below:

x=

H1 H 2
=
= f ( x, u1 , u2 , t ) ,
1 2

x ( t0 ) = x0

1 = −

L ( x, u1 , u2 , t )
f ( x, u1 , u2 )
H1
=− 1
− 1
,
x
x
x

1 (T ) =

2 = −

L ( x, u1 , u2 , t )
f ( x, u1 , u2 )
H 2
=− 2
− 2
,
x
x
x

2 (T ) =

(1.10)

K1 ( x (T ) )
x (T )

K 2 ( x (T ) )
x (T )

(1.11)

(1.12)

u1* = min H1 ( x, u1 , uˆ2 , t ) 

H1
=0
u1

(1.13)

u2* = min H 2 ( x, uˆ1 , u2 , t ) 

H 2
=0
u2

(1.14)

u1U1

u2 U 2

These are the necessary conditions for the open-loop Nash strategy nonzero-sum differential
system. Notice that these equations have mixed boundary where the state equation has a known
initial state, while the costate equations have the terminal costate values with solving these three
7

differential equations with two algebraic equations (stationary conditions 4 and 5) yield to
determine the open-loop Nash equilibrium. However, solving such an equation in general not easy
to solve. Though for some application of linear state variable and quadratic objective function can
be solved analytically, most of them must are solved numerically.
1.4 Stackelberg Control Startegy
The Stackelberg control option is based on one controller having the capability to design
its controller first, due to its size or faster means of information processing and refers to it as a
“leader” [87, 88]. Thus, the Stackelberg solution of the two-controller nonzero-sum solution is
based on assuming these two-controller systems are different in their roles in such the control
systems are designed hierarchically. Therefore, a controller is called a leader, and the other
controller is referred to as a follower. The follower follows the leader's strategy in which the leader
announces his strategy first, and the follower determines his controller according to the leader’s
announced strategy. The leader foresees and effectively dominate the entire controls determination
process
Let U1 and U 2 be the controller 1and controller 2 admissible sets, respectively, and in turn,
if their corresponding objective functions are J1 (u1 , u2 ) and J 2 (u1 , u2 ) , where the u1  U1 . and

u2  U 2 Now if controller 2 is assigned to be the leader and supposed there is exist a mapping such
that T : U 2 → U1 such that
J1 (Tu2 , u2 )  J1 ( u1 , u2 )

u1 U1

(1.15)

For every u2  U 2 , then as a rational reaction from controller 1, the follower, the following set
D1 = ( u1 , u2 )  U1  U 2 : u1 = Tu2 , u2 U 2 
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(1.16)

is called the rational reaction set for controller 1 when controller 2 is the leader. Moreover, if there
is a pair ( u1S 2 , u2 S 2 )  D1 such that1
J 2 ( u1S 2 , u2 S 2 )  J 2 ( u1 , u2 )

 ( u1 , u2 )  D1

(1.17)

Where ( u1S 2 , u2 S 2 ) is called a Stackelberg strategy pair when the controller is the leader. Hence,
the same process is done when controller 1 is the leader with a change of the indices. The rational
reaction is set for controller 2, which is now the follower, denoted by D2 and the pair

( u1S1 , u2 S1 )  D2 .

For the above approach, it is clear that the intersection for both the rational

reaction sets Dl  D2 , then the common pair ( u1N , u2 N ) is the Nash solution of the two-controller
system. In this case: if controller 2 is the leader, J 2 ( u1S 2 , u2 S 2 )  J 2 ( u1N , u2 N ) similarly if controller
1is the leader J1 ( u1S 1 , u2 S 1 )  J1 ( u1N , u2 N ) .
1.4.1 Stackelberg Open-Loop Solution in Dynamic Systems
The necessary conditions for the existence of the Stackelberg open-loop control can be
obtained based on the Stackelberg solution is obtained in the hierarchical scheme. For instance,
assume the leader C2 and announce his strategy first, which leaves controller 1, the follower, with
no choice just to solve his problem by considering the leader’s announcement.
1.4.2 For the Following controller

The Hamiltonian function for the follower, Controller, C1

1 where the subscription beside the controls index;𝑆2 , the letter S=Stackelberg and number 2 is when the leader is controller

9

H1 ( x, u1 , u2 , 1 , t ) = L1 ( x, u1 , u2 , t ) + 1 f ( x, u1 , u2 )

The necessary condition for the follower is as follow:

x=

H1
= f ( x, u1 , u2 , t ) ,
1

1 = −

x ( t0 ) = x0

L ( x, u1 , u2 , t )
f ( x, u1 , u2 , t )
H1
=− 1
− 1
,
x
x
x

1 (T ) =

(1.18)

K1 ( x (T ) )
x (T )

H1
= 0  u1* = min H1 ( x, u1 , uˆ2 , t )
u1U1
u1

(1.19)

(1.20)

And from the latter condition, there is a reaction for the follower, and for each possible
action from the leader, there is a reaction from the follower then u1* = u1 ( uˆ2 ( t ) ) .
1.4.3 For the Leading controller

Now, the leader must face two constrains to optimize his objective function, the state
dynamic equation and the co-state dynamic condition for the follower
The constructed Hamiltonian function for the leader C2 becomes as shown in equation (1.21):
H 2 ( x, u1* ( u2 ) , u2 , 2 ,  , t ) =
 L1 ( x, u1* ( u2 ) , u2 , t )
f ( x, u1* ( u2 ) , u2 , t ) 
L2 ( x, u ( u2 ) , u2 , t ) + 2 f ( x, u ( u2 ) , u2 ) +   −
− 1



x

x


*
1

*
1

(1.21)

Where 2 ,  are the costate variables of the leading controller. Thus, the necessary conditions for
the leading controller are

x=

H 2
= f ( x, u1* ( u2 ) , u2 , t ) ,
2

x ( t0 ) = x0

10

(1.22)

L1 ( x, u1* ( u2 ) , u2 , t )
f ( x, u1* ( u2 ) , u2 , t )
H 2
1 =
=−
− 1
,

x
x

1 (T ) =

K1 ( x (T ) )
x (T )

(1.22)

And the costate differential equations are derived as follow:

  2 L1 ( x, u1* ( u2 ) , u2 , t )
L2 ( x, u1* ( u2 ) , u2 , t )
f ( x, u1* ( u2 ) , u2 )
f ( x, u1* ( u 2 ) , u 2 , t ) 
H 2
2 = −
=−
− 2
+ 
+ 1

2
2

x
x
x

x

x


With terminal value 2 (T ) =

K 2 ( x (T ) )
x (T )

  2 K1 ( x (T ) ) 
−  (T ) 

2
 x (T ) 

  2 f ( x, u1* ( u2 ) , u2 , t ) 
H 2
,
 =−
= 


1
1x



(1.23)

 ( 0) = 0

And the stationary condition for controller 2, the leader,

(1.24)

is as follow:

H 2
= 0  u2* = min H 2 ( x, u1* ( u2 ) , u2 , t )
u2 U 2
u2

(1.25)

Again, the resulting conditions consider as a two-boundary point problem, and solving such a
problem, in general, is not easy in general. In this dissertation, the solution is obtained for some
illustrative examples, depending on the system's type, numerically, and analytically.
The optimal control of systems governed by multiple controllers rather than one controller
leads to many questions that need to be addressed. This dissertation addresses the Nash and
Stackelberg strategies to construct solutions for such problems. More specifically, the
implementation of the feedback controls in sample data form is addressed.
In the open-loop control design for multiple controller systems, the design control needs
only for the state vector's initial state and will be a function of time as well. The other option is the
closed-loop control option, in which the measurements of the state vector in each instance of time
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must be available. This requirement for designing a closed-loop may be expensive, and in some
cases, not possible. The dissertation's proposed method is that the sampled closed loop and the
samples are pre-specified and equally distributed. In each sample of this proposed approach, the
control is designed in its open-loop scheme, and thus the whole interval is represented by these
open-loop controls. This type of control is sampled closed-loop, which is a trade-off between the
simplicity of designing a single open-loop and reap the advantage of the feedback closed-loop.
Remarkably, the more samples, the sampled closed loop is approaching to continuous closed loop
on the Nash control design. For the Stackelberg, increasing the samples leads to the sampled
closed-loop approaching the continuous Nash closed loop.
The Stackelberg option is a Leader-Follower approach in which there is a leader controller
who announces his strategy first, and the other controller is a follower. However, if these roles are
predetermined, this option can be in mutual agreement: when both realize that they are better off
with the agreed leader’s selection, the other is selected as a leader. The other possible situation is
when both prefer to be leaders or both followers. In this dissertation, we suggest when the
parameter uncertainty, the role selection option availability is dependent on the parameters space
over which the system is defined. In this dissertation, we define the partitioning of the parameter
space to classify the ability and availability of the design of the Stackelberg implementation or not.
The resulting region of the parameter space is used to determine the probability of leadership
determination.

12

1.5 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into four main chapters. Chapter one is an introductory
chapter with a general review of the optimal control problem and its natural extension to the
multiple controllers' problem, each with its designated own objective functions. Chapter two
proposes a new method to reap the advantage of the closed-loop properties by designing a lesscostly and straightforward controller for multi-controller systems, which needs fewer amounts of
state vector measurements. In chapter three, we discuss a significant property for Leader-Follower
Stackelberg systems, which is so little explored, and we try to give attention to the importance of
the leadership role with possible changing of the system parameters. Chapter four applies multicontroller multi-objective systems in dynamic microeconomic systems where two firms are
maximizing profits by controlling their production outputs. Finally, we conclude this dissertation
and suggest new paths for future research in chapter five.
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CHAPTER TWO
SAMPLED CLOSED-LOOP
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider control systems controlled by multiple controllers, each having
its own objective function. The Nash and leader-follower Stackelberg options for designing the
controls are considered. These control options are heavily used as decision options in the nonzero-sum differential solution theory. To reap many of the benefits of feedback, the resulting
designs are best implemented as closed-loop controls. However, closed-loop controls require
continuous measurements of the system’s state vector, which may be expensive or even impossible
in many cases.

As an alternative, in this chapter, we consider a sampled closed -loop

implementation. Such an implementation requires the state-vector measurements only at prespecified instants of time and hence is much more practical and cost-effective compared to the
continuous closed-loop implementation. We derive the necessary conditions for the general linearquadratic problem, develop the Nash's solutions, and Stackelberg controls in detail for the scalar
case. An example of a control system with two controllers and state measurements available at
integer multiples of 10% of the total control interval is presented to illustrate the results.
2.2 Motivation
The multi-controller multi-objective control systems theory deals with control systems
whose state variables are controlled by two or more independent controllers, each trying to
minimize its own objective function. Systems of this type occur in many applications in smart
energy buildings [60], load frequency control, and automatic voltage regulation in power systems
14

[48, 91], biomedical systems [27], to mention a few. Unlike single controller problems where
optimality is easily defined in minimizing one objective function, defining what optimality means
in multi-controller multi-objective problems is much more complicated. Since the state variables,
and consequently the objective functions, depending on all controllers' control action, defining
optimality must be done in terms of the choice of controls as implemented by all controllers
simultaneously and collectively. The principle of optimality in these systems is defined in terms
of the rationale assumed by each controller in determining its control variables. Several d ifferent
rationales, leading to different definitions of optimality, have been explored in the past several
decades, mainly within differential solution theory.
The Nash rationale [83], first introduced to the control literature in [84], describes a noncooperative situation in which each controller’s control rationale is to safeguard itself against
attempts by any other controller from further improving its objective by deviating from its agreed
Nash control. This concept of optimality assumes that all controllers know each other’s objective
functions and that when the controls have been determined, they are all determined and
implemented simultaneously at the same time. Another concept, which has proven to be very
useful in two-controller systems, is the Stackelberg rationale [86]. This concept, first introduced
to the control literature in [27], also describes a non-cooperative situation except that due to size,
importance, or faster means of information processing, one controller can arrive and implement its
control actions before the other. The controller that can implement its control first is referred to
as the “leader” and the other as the “follower.” Thus, the Stackelberg solution is based on a
hierarchy of control decision-making and is very powerful in deriving optimal controls for the
leader controller that would benefit it due to the timing advantage over the follower controller.
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Whether the controllers in a multi-control system are applying Nash or Stackelberg
controls, they always must make an additional decision on how their controls are to be
implemented in practice. As is well known in single controller problems, control variables can be
implemented in either open-loop or closed-loop form. The open-loop form is simpler to implement
in that it only requires knowledge by all controllers of the state variables' initial conditions. It
represents control functions of time that do not depend on the evolution of the state of the system
and hence cannot be adjusted if system parameters drift from their nominal values or unknown
nonlinear distortions occur at any time during the implementation of the control. On the other
hand, the closed-loop form is more complex to implement in that it requires knowledge of the state
vector at every instant of time during implementation, thus necessitating the placement of sensors
or filters at critical locations of the system to provide measurements of the state variables. This
form has a clear advantage [92] over the open-loop form in that should any small perturbations
occur is the system’s parameters, or should any unknown distortions occur, the state variables
would change accordingly, causing an adjustment in the control variables to keep the state
variables as close as possible to their prescribed optimal trajectories. Such an adjustment would
not occur in the open-loop implementation because the control variables are completely unaware
of the system's state once the system is past its initial state.
An added complication in multi-controller systems, which does not exist in single
controller systems, is that the open-loop and closed-loop controls are different and produce
different state trajectories even under ideal conditions [27, 48]. Because the state variable may or
may not be available to the other controllers for implementation, making the design of the control
variables for each controller completely different and dependent on the information structure
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available to the controllers; thus, the controllers must decide whether they would be implementing
open-loop or closed-loop controls prior to determining their control variables. This decision is
very important and must be communicated or known to all the controllers in the system.
Furthermore, the controllers must accept and implement the same control structure used in the
controls' design process. Some controllers' option using open-loop and others using closed-loop
is also possible; however, simplicity will not be considered in this chapter.
One of the main issues that may deter the controllers from implementing closed -loop
controls is cost. Clearly, the placement of sensors, or measurement devices, to measure the state
variables continuously over time and transmitting that information to the controllers at every
instant of time is a very costly process and in some cases may even be impossible due to the
environment in which the state variables are measured. For example, in a metal forming process,
the high temperatures of the environment around the state variables (could be greater than 800o F)
may prevent the possibility of permanently placing sensors in that environment. Instead, a less
costly and more practical option could be to measure the state variables at pre -specified instants
of time [93], which may or may not necessarily be uniformly distributed over the interval of
optimization. The controllers would then implement closed-loop controls only at the instants when
measurements are obtained and implement open-loop controls following those instants until the
next instant when measurement becomes available again. The design of such controllers would
be an intermediate option between the open-loop and continuous closed-loop options. The fewer
the measurement samples would produce controls that are closer to the open -loop option, and the
larger the number of measurement samples would produce controls that are closer to the
continuous closed-loop option. We will refer to this control structure as a sampled-closed-loop. In
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this chapter, we will investigate the implementation of this new control structure in the case of
linear quadratic multi-controller systems. Without loss of generality and for simplicity of notation,
we will consider only the case of two controllers. Almost all the results derived in this chapter can
be easily extended to the case of M-controller systems where M > 2. Furthermore, in the case of
the Stackelberg controls, without loss of generality, we will only consider the case where controller
2 is the leader controller. The results can be easily duplicated for the case where controller 1 is
the leader.
2.3 Linear Quadratic Multi-Controller Systems.
Linear quadratic systems are a very important class of control systems for which optimal
controllers can be easily derived analytically [1]. A linear-quadratic two-controller system is a
control system described by the linear differential equation:

x = Ax + B1u1 + B2u2 , x(t0 )=x 0

(2.1)

where x is the state vector, u1 is the control vector of controller 1, and u 2 is the control
vector of controller 2. The objective functions for the two controllers are quadratic in the form:
tf

1
1
J1 (u1 , u2 ) = xf C1 x f +  ( xQ1 x + u1R1u1 )dt
2
2 to

(2.2)

tf

1
1
and J 2 (u1 , u2 ) = xf C2 x f +  ( xQ2 x + u2 R2u2 )dt
2
2 to

(2.3)

respectively, where all matrices are symmetric and of proper dimensions andR1 and R2 are
positive definite matrices. Controller 1 wants to minimize J 1 , while controller 2 wants to minimize
−1
−1
J 2 . Defining the following matricesE1 = B1 R1 B1 and E2 = B2 R2 B2 , it is known [84] that the open-

loop Nash controls for this problem are of the form:
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and

u1N (t ) = − R1−1 B1K1 (t , to ) xo

(2.4)

u2N (t ) = − R2−1 B2 K 2 (t , to ) xo

(2.5)

where (t , to ) , K1 (t ) , and K2 (t ) satisfy the coupled differential equations:

 (t , to ) = ( A − E1K1 − E2 K2 ) (t , to ),

 (to , to ) = I

K1 = − AK1 − K1 A − Q1 + K1 E1 K1 + K1 E2 K 2 ,

K1 (t f ) = C1

K 2 = − AK 2 − K 2 A − Q2 + K 2 E2 K 2 + K 2 E1K1 ,

K 2 (t f ) = C2

(2.6)

(2.7)

(2.8)

It is also known [88] that the open-loop Stackelberg controls with controller 2 as the leader
is of the form:
u1S 2 (t ) = − R1−1 B1S1 (t , to ) xo

and u2S 2 (t ) = − R2−1 B2 S 2 (t , to ) xo

(2.9)

(2.10)

Where  (t , t0 ) , S1 (t ) , and S 2 (t ) satisfy the coupled differential equations:

 (t , to ) = ( A − E1S1 − E2 S 2 ) (t , to )

 (t o , t o ) = I

S1 = − AS1 − S1 A − Q1 + S1 E1S1 + S1E2 S 2 ,

S 2 = − AS 2 − S 2 A − Q2 + Q1 P + S 2 E2 S 2 + S 2 E1S1 ,

P = AP − PA + PE1S1 + PE2 S 2 + E1S 2
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(2.11)

S1 (t f ) = C1

(2.12)

S 2 (t f ) = C2 − C1P (t f )

(2.13)

P (to ) = 0

(2.14)

Note that equations (2.9)-(2.11) are very similar to equations (2.5)-(2.7) except that
equation (3.11) has the extra term Q1P in it that depends on the solution of the linear equation in
(2.12).
In both cases, the values of the objective functions when either the Nash or Stackelberg
controls are used are given by:

J1 =

1
xo M 1 (to ) xo
2

(2.15)

1
xo M 2 (to ) xo
2
where M 1 (t ) and M 2 (t ) satisfy the linear differential equations:
J2 =

(2.16)

M 1 = −( A − E1 L1 − E2 L2 )M 1 − M 1 ( A − E1 L1 − E2 L2 ) − Q1 − L1E1 L1 , M 1 (t f ) = C1

(2.17)

M 2 = −( A − E1 L1 − E2 L2 )M 2 − M 2 ( A − E1 L1 − E2 L2 ) − Q2 − L2 E2 L2 ,

(2.18)

M 2 (t f ) = C2

Where L1 and L2 are replaced by K1 and K2 from equations (2.6) and (2.7) in the case of
the Nash controls and are replaced by S1 and S2 from equations (2.10) and (2.11) in the case of the
Stackelberg controls.
2.4 Implementation of the Sampled Closed-Loop Controls
To simplify the notation, we will now illustrate these controls' implementation on
a scalar linear-quadratic system. The extension to higher dimensionality systems can be easily
done in a very similar way. Consider the two-controller scalar system:
x = ax + b1u1 + b2u2 , t  [to , t f ),

x(to ) is given

(2.19)

tf

1
1
2
J1 (to ) = c1 x 2 (t f ) +  (q1 x 2 + ru
1 1 )dt
2
2 to

(2.20)

tf

1
1
J 2 (to ) = c2 x 2 (t f ) +  (q2 x 2 + r2u22 )dt
2
2 to
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(2.21)

Let us now assume that measurements of the state vector can be obtained at discrete pre specified instants of time to , t1 ,

, tn −1 such to  t1 

 tn −1  t f and which may or may not be

uniformly distributed over the interval [to , t f ) . Starting at the interval [tn −1 , t f ) and proceeding
backward in time until the first interval [to , t1 ) is reached, we will solve for the controls successively
as described below. Assume that at instant ti the state vector x (ti ) can is available for
measurement by both controllers who will then design and implement sampled closed -loop
controls of the form u1 (t , x(ti )) and u2 (t , x(ti )) over the interval t  [ti , ti +1 ) . The system equation
over this interval [ti , ti +1 ) is:

x = ax + b1u1 + b2u2 , t [ti , ti +1 ),

x(ti ) available

1
1
and J1 (ti ) = m1 (ti +1 ) x 2 (ti +1 ) +
2
2
J 2 (ti ) =

1
1
m2 (ti +1 ) x 2 (ti +1 ) +
2
2

ti+1

 (q x
t
1

2

2
+ ru
1 1 )dt

(2.22)
(2.23)

i

ti+1

t (q x
2

2

+ r2u22 )dt

(2.24)

i

The Nash controls over the interval t  [ti , ti +1 ) are obtained from (2.4) and (2.5) -(2.7) and
are of the form:
b1

k1 x(ti ) 
r1


b2
N
u2 (t , x(ti )) = − k2 x(ti ) 

r2
b2
b2
Where, assuming that e1 = 1 and e2 = 2 , we have
r2
r1
u1N (t , x(ti )) = −

 = (a − e1k1 − e2k2 ) ,
k1 = −2ak1 − q1 + e1k12 + e2 k1k 2 ,
k2 = −2ak2 − q2 + e k + e1k1k2 ,
2
2 2

(2.25)

 (ti ) = 1

(2.26)

k1 (ti +1 ) = m1 (ti +1 )

(2.27)

k2 (ti +1 ) = m2 (ti +1 )
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(2.28)

Once k1 (t ) and k2 (t ) are determined from the above equations, the values of the objective
functions are obtained as:

J1 (ti ) =

1
m1 (ti ) x 2 (ti )
2

(2.29)

J 2 (ti ) =

1
m2 (ti ) x 2 (ti )
2

(2.30)

Where m1 (t ) and m2 (t ) satisfy the linear differential equations obtained (2.17) and(2.18):
m1 = −2(a − e1k1 − e2 k2 )m1 − q1 − e1k12 ,

m1i (ti +1 ) = m1i +1 (ti )

(2.31)

m2 = −2(a − e1k1 − e2 k2 )m2 − q2 − e2 k22 ,

m2i (ti +1 ) = m2i +1 (ti )

(2.32)

We can follow a similar procedure for the Stackelberg controls. For the interval t  [ti , ti +1 )
the controls are obtained from (2.4) and (2.9)-(2.10) and are of the form:
b1

s1 x(ti ) 
r1


b2
S
u2 (t , x(ti )) = − s2 x(ti ) 

r2

 = (a − e1s1 − e2 s2 ) ,
 (0) = 1
u1S (t , x(ti )) = −

Where:

s1 = −2as1 − q1 + e1s12 + e2 s1s2 ,
s2 = −2as2 − q2 + q1 p + e2 s22 + e1s1s2 ,

s1 (ti +1 ) = m1 (ti +1 )

s2 (ti +1 ) = m2 (ti +1 ) − m1 (ti +1 ) p (ti +1 )

(2.33)

(2.34)
(2.35a)

(2.35b)

(2.36)
p = (e1s1 + e2 s2 ) p + e1s2 , p(ti ) = 0
Once s1 (t ) and s2 (t ) are determined from the above equations, the values of the objective
functions are obtained as:
22

1

m1 (ti ) x 2 (ti ) 

2
(2.37)

1
2

J 2 (ti ) = m2 (ti ) x (ti )

2
where m1 (t ) and m2 (t ) satisfy the linear differential equations obtained from (2.17) and
J1 (ti ) =

(2.8):
m1i (ti +1 ) = m1i +1 (ti )

m1 = −2(a − e1s1 − e2 s2 )m1 − q1 − e1s12 ,

(2.38)
m2i (ti +1 ) = m2i +1 (ti )

m2 = −2(a − e1s1 − e2 s2 )m2 − q2 − e2 s22 ,

(2.39)

As mentioned earlier, for both the Nash and Stackelberg controls, the process starts at the
last interval of time [tn −1 , t f ) where the boundary conditions at t = t f

are given as c1 and c2

proceeds backward in time until the interval [to , t1 ) is reached. We will now illustrate the derivation
of the Nash and Stackelberg controls for the following two-controller control system.
2.5 An Illustrative Example
Consider the following two-controller system:

x = x + u1 − u2 , t [0,1), x(0) = 1

(2.40)

Let the objective function of controller 1 be:
J1 = x 2 (1) +

1

1
(2 x 2 (t ) +u12 (t ))dt
2 0

(2.41)

And the objective function of controller 2 be:
1

1
J 2 = −2 x (1) +  (−4 x 2 (t ) + 3u22 (t ))dt
20
2
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(2.42)

With the coefficients multiplying x 2 being positive in J 1 and negative in J 2 , clearly
minimizing these objective functions represents a situation where controller 1 is trying to drive the
state variable x towards the origin (i.e., regulate the system) while controller 2 is trying to drive it
away from the origin (i.e., destabilize the system). The interval of control is [0,1] . We will
consider the case of sampled-closed-loop control, where only ten state vector measurements are
available ti = 0.1(n − 1),for n = 1,

,10 . Comparing (2.40)-(2.42) with (2.19)-(2.21) the system

parameters are a = 1, b1 = 1and b2 = −1 , the parameters for controller 1 are c1 = q1 = 2 and r1 = 1 ,
the parameters for controller 2 are c2 = q2 = −4 , and r2 = 3 . Following (2.25), the Nash controls
for this system are u1N (t , x(ti )) = −k1 x(ti ) and u2N (t , x(ti )) = 1/ 3k2 x(ti ) . Similarly, following
(2.33) the Stackelberg controls with controller 2 as a leader are u1S (t , x(ti )) = − s1 x(ti ) and
u2s (t , x(ti )) = 1/ 3s2 x(ti ) .

Plots of all solution variables for this problem are shown in Figures

(2.1) through (2.8). Figures (2.1) and (2.2) show plots of the feedback gains for both the Nash and
Stackelberg controls. These are plotted as a pair on the same graph to illustrate the difference
between the two solutions. While k1 and s1 having the same boundary condition at t=1, k 2 and s2
have different boundary conditions due to the p(t) variable in (3.33), which is plotted versus time
in figure (2.3).
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Figure (2.1): Plots of k1 (t ) and s1 (t ) vs. time

Figure (2.2): Plots of k2 (t ) and s2 (t ) vs. time
25

Figure (2.3): Plot of p(t ) for the Stackelberg control vs. time

Plots of the parameters m1 (t ) and m2 (t ) which characterize the objective functions are
shown in Figures (2.4) and (2.5), and plots of the controls and state trajectories are shown in
Figures (2.6)-(2.8), respectively. Clearly, the state variable's trajectory is approaching the origin,
which means it has been regulated. This result indicates that controller1 has been able to
accomplish its objective in spite of the fact that controller 2 was trying to drive the state away from
the origin. Plots of the objective functions' values J 1 and J 2 for both the Nash and Stackelberg
controls are shown in Figures (2.9) and (2.10). It is clear from Figure (2.10) that J 2S  J 2N at every

t [0,1] which means, as expected, that the leader in the Stackelberg solution (controller 2 in this
case) achieves better performance using a Stackelberg control rather than a Nash control.
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Figure (2.4): plots of m1 (t ) vs. time

Figure (2.5): Plots of m2 (t ) vs. time
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Figure (2.6): Plots of the Nash and Stackelberg controls for controller 1 vs. time.

Figure (2.7): Plots of the Nash and Stackelberg controls for controller 2 vs. time.
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Figure (2.8): Plots x(t ) for both the Nash and the Stackelberg controls vs. time

Figure (2.9): Plots of controller 1 cost-to-go (Nash and the Stackelberg) vs. time.
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Figure (2.10): Plots of controller 2 cost-to-go (Nash and the Stackelberg) vs. time.

2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have considered systems that are controlled by more than one controller,
each having its own objective function. The optimal control of such systems does not simply
involve minimizing the objective functions, but it also involves how the various controllers interact
with each other and how they take the controls of the other controllers into account. In this chapter,
we have considered the Nash and Stackelberg control rationales. These solution concepts are very
popular in the context of dynamic solutions. We have considered the special case of linear
quadratic systems with two controllers and derived and solved in detail all the accompanying
necessary differential equations for the scalar case. We then considered the implementation of
sampled closed-loop controls. These controls are closed-loop types expect that the feedback loops
30

are closed only at specific instants of time when the state-vector is available for measurement. We
have included a two-controller example to illustrate the results.
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CHAPTER THREE
LEADERSHIP SELECTION WITH PARAMETER UNCERTAINTY

In leader-follower Stackelberg games, the leader determines and announces its strategy first
by anticipating the follower’s reaction function, and the follower determines its strategy as the best
response to the leader’s strategy. Thus, there is a perceived advantage in assuming the role of a
leader in a Stackelberg game. When the controllers' roles are not determined a propri, both
controllers must mutually agree on the selection of the leader. Such an agreement is possible only
if the controllers realize that they are both better off with the agreed selection of leader than when
the other controller is selected as leader. In games with parameter uncertainty, th is option's
availability depends on the parameter space over which the game is defined. This chapter describes
the partitioning of the parameter space to characterize when a Stackelberg solution based on an
agreed leader selection exists and when it does not. The resulting partition can then be used to
determine the probability of all possible games where agreement can and cannot be reached. We
illustrate the results using two examples.
3.1 Introduction
The Stackelberg solution [86-88] in two-player nonzero-sum static and dynamic games
provides an alternative to the Nash solution [83-85] when the two players' roles can be defined as
leader and follower. The leader in a Stackelberg game decides on its strategy first, and the follower
determines its strategy as the best response to the leader’s strategy. The Nash and Stackelberg
solutions have received considerable attention in both the multiple controller's literature over the
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past 50 years or so. The recent books [94] by Basar and Olsder, [95] Yong, [90]Ungureanu , and
[96] Lambertini provide a very good summary and include most of the relevant references related
to these two solutions. One of the main advantages of the Stackelberg solution, as was demonstrated
in [88] and [97], is that the Stackelberg solution is advantageous over the Nash solution for the
leader. A controller is always better off being a leader in a Stackelberg game than an equal
controller in the Nash game. Hence, as expected, both controllers will compete for the leadership
role either by acquiring faster means of decision-making or by trying to become dominant in size.
In doing so, however, each controller has ignored considering the possibility that being a follower
might be a more beneficial option to it than being a leader. While this would not be possible in a
duopoly with two profit-maximizing firms, Hou et al [98], it is a highly probable outcome in twoplayer games in general. To illustrate this point let us first consider the simple 2- controller matrix
game is shown in Figure (3.1), where each controller has three decision choices. controller C1
decides on the x variables and wants to minimize its payoff consisting of the first entries in the
matrix and controller C2 decides on the y variables and wants to minimize its payoff consisting of
the second entries in the matrix. The Stackelberg Solution with C1 as leader is {x2 , y3 } yielding
payoffs of (3, 4) and the Stackelberg Solution with P2 as leader is {x1 , y1} yielding payoffs of
(4, 7). Clearly, in this case, both controllers will do better when P1 is the leader and would therefore
would readily agree that P1 should be the leader.
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y1

y2

y3

x1

4, 7

6,16

7, 5

x2

9, 14

11,13

3, 4

x3

10,15

5,10

2,11

Figure (3.1): A Matrix Example

In games where the leader's selection is negotiable, each of the two controllers will need to
compare the outcome of the games when it plays the role of leader and when it agrees for the other
controller to play the role of leader. Thus, there are four possible options for the controllers to
consider. Two options occur when each controller determines that it is preferable for it to be a leader
while simultaneously, the other determines that it is preferable for it to be a follower. These two
latter options are implementable since, in each case, the controllers can reach a mutual agreement
on the selection of the leader. A third option occurs when each controller determines that it is
preferable for it to be a leader and for the other controller to be a follower, and a fourth option
occurs when each controller determines that it is preferable for the other controller to be a leader
and for it to be a follower. Clearly, neither of these last two options is implementable since the
controllers cannot mutually agree on the leader's selection, and a stalemate will prevail. The
deadlock can be resolved either by the controllers adopting a Nash approach or by one controller
considering making side payments to the other controller as an incentive to agree to be a follower.
The possibility of distributing the roles in a Stackelberg game was first mentioned in [99] Basar in
the context of a scalar differential game example. It was also considered in [100] Boyer & Moreaux,
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and [101] Dowrick in the context of static duopoly problems where it is agreed that even in the
competitive framework between two firms in a duopoly, it is not unreasonable to expect that they
may end up coordinating the distribution of their roles as leader and follower in a mutually
advantageous way. Later on, [102]Van Damme and Hurkens argued that committing to the role of
leadership is less risky for the low-cost firm so that such a firm will emerge as a leader is a
Stackelberg duopoly. In a more recent paper, [103] Liu questioned whether a leader firm in a
duopoly really has a strategic advantage in practice under demand uncertainty. The paper cites
several examples of market leaders in the dotcom era that ended up not sustaining the business due
to uncertainty in demand. Another recent paper [104] Nie, Wand, and Cui argue that in repeated
games, controllers acting as leaders, in turn, improves cooperation and consequently enhances
social welfare.
While most of the early applications of the Stackelberg strategy were in duopoly type
economic problems, in recent years, there has been an emergence of interest in the Stackelberg
solution as an effective mechanism for analyzing many of today’s complex engineering systems.
These include the smart electric grids [105-108], wireless communication systems [109, 110],
cyber-physical systems [111, 112], and others. The Stackelberg solution has also been of interest in
problems related to security resource allocation [113], artificial intelligence [114, 115], economics,
management, and marketing systems [116-118], and others. Many of these complex systems do
not have a naturally designated leader leaving the leadership position open for negotiation. The
selection of a leader becomes a very important issue that will affect the entire system's performance.
Selecting or negotiating who should be the leader in these systems becomes very important,
especially when it is not obvious that being a leader is always advantageous.
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In this chapter, we explore the partitioning of the parameter space to characterize the
various regions when the controllers can mutually agree, and when they do not, on the selection of
the game leader. If the parameters probability distribution is known, the resulting partition of the
parameter space can then be used to determine the probability of all possible options of leader
selection. We illustrate the results with two examples where the parameters are uniformly
distributed over a bounded space and show how the probabilities of the existence of either
controller's mutually acceptable selection as a leader can be determined.
3.2 Stackelberg Solutions with Uncertain Parameters:
In Stackelberg games defined over a space of uncertain parameters where the leader is to
be selected by mutual agreement, the challenge is to determine probabilities of occurrence of a
game where it is advantageous for each of the two controllers to be select as the leader. To
accomplish this, the regions in the parameter space that delineate wh en it is advantageous for each
controller to be selected as a leader need to be determined. Let Ω be the space of uncertain game
parameters, and let iL  , i = 1, 2 be the set of parameters such that the controller i prefers2 [119]
to be the leader and iF =  − iL be the set of parameters such that the Controller i prefers to be
a follower. Then Ω can be divided into two regions: (1) A region of Agreement, ΩA, representing
parameters that characterize Stackelberg solutions where both controllers agree on the leader
selection, and a region of disagreement, ΩD, representing parameters that characterize Stackelberg
solutions where both controllers cannot agree on the leader selection. The region of agreement ΩA

2

The preference can be either based on a cardinal ranking of the choices available to each player according to an
objective function or on an ordinal raking of the choices based on each players’ subjective preference
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consists of two feasible sub-regions  A1 = 1L   2F representing the region where both
controllers agree that controller 1 should be selected as the leader and  A2 = 1F   2L represent
the region where both controllers agree that controller 2 should be selected. Similarly, ΩD can be
divided into two sub-regions:  DL = 1L   2L representing solutions where both controllers
disagree in that both want to be selected as leaders and  DF = 1F   2F where both controllers
disagree in that both want the other controller to be selected as leader. Characterizing these regions
in the parameter space will not only provide information about solutions where the leader
selections by mutual agreement are possible but also will allow for a determination of the
probabilities of occurrence of each of these solutions. Such probabilities will help the controllers
decide a priori on the most advantageous selection of the leader between them.
To clarify these concepts, let us first consider the simple 2-controller matrix solution shown
in Figure (3.1), where each controller has three decision choices. The controller C1 controls the x
variables and wants to minimize the first entry in the matrix, and the controller C2 controls the y
variables and wants to minimize the second entry in the matrix. The solution has two uncertain
parameters  and  in the matrix entries that are uniformly distributed over the bounded region

 = {( ,  ) such that 0    8 and 0    12} . Following [99], it can be easily shown that the
Stackelberg solution with controller 1, C1 as a leader, always occurs at the location { x2 , y3 } , and
the Stackelberg solution with controller 2, C2 , as a leader, always occurs at the location {x1 , y1}
for all ( ,  )  . Furthermore, it can be easily shown, as illustrated in Figure (3.2), that:

1) A1 = {( ,  )  such that 3    4 and 0    7}
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2) A2 = {( ,  )  such that 0    3 and7    12}
3) D1 = {( ,  )  such that 3    8 and 7    12}
4) D 2 = {( ,  )  such that 0    3 and 0    7}
The four regions and their probabilities of occurrence of corresponding solutions are
indicated in Figure (3.2). Clearly, the largest region in the parameter space is the region of
agreement  A implying that there is a 36% probability that a solution will occur where both
controllers agree that should be selected as leader and 16% probability that a solution will occur
where both agree that C2 be selected as to be the leader. These are both feasible Stackelberg
solutions by mutual agreement. Figure (3.2) also indicates that there is a 48% probability that a
solution will occur where an agreement is not possible with a 26% probability due to both
controllers want to be selected as leaders and 22% probability due to neither controller wants to
be selected as leader. This simple example illustrates the importance of determining the regions in
the parameter space where agreement can be reached on selecting the solution leader.

y1

y2

y3

x1

, 7

6,16

7, 5

x2

9, 14

11,13

3, 

x3

10,15

5,10

2,11

Figure (3.2): Matrix example with variables of 𝛼, 𝛽
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Figure (3.3): Characterization of the Parameter Space Ω for the solution in figure (3.2)

3.3 Differential Solution example
Consider the first-order linear-quadratic differential game example described by
the linear differential equation:

x = u1 − u2 , t [0,1] , and x(0) = x0

(3.1)

and quadratic cost functions

1
1
J1 (u1 , u2 ) = c1 x 2 (1) +
2
2c p

u

1
1
J 2 (u1 , u2 ) = c2 x 2 (1) +
2
2ce

1

1

2
1

(t )dt

(3.2)

 u (t )dt

(3.3)

0

0

2
2

where x is the state variable, u1 and u2 are the control variables of Controllers C1 and C2
respectively and J 1 J 2 are their respective cost functions. This classic simple example was first
considered in [120] Ho, Bryson, and Baron (1965) and has been used since then as a benchmark
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example to illustrate numerous solution concepts in differential game theory. Note that J 1 and J 2
include the scalars parameters c p , ce , c1 , and c2 , which for the problem to be well defined, must
satisfy the conditions:
{c p  0, ce  0, c1  0, c2  0}

(3.4)

If the value of these parameters were known a priori, then it will be possible to determine
whether or not both controllers can agree on who should be selected as leader. Using the notation
uisj and J i (u1sj , u2 sj ) , or simply J i j , to denote the Stackelberg strategy and corresponding cost for

controller i when controller j is leader, then both controller s will agree for controller 1 to be selected
leader if J11  J12 and J 21  J 22 both will agree for controller 2 to be selected leader if J12  J11 and
J 22  J 21 . In this chapter, we will assume that the parameters c p , ce , c1 , and c2 are uncertain, and as

a result, it is not possible to determine a priori whether a leader selection is feasible or not. To the
simplicity of notation, let us define the parameters
c p , ce , c1 , and c2

(3.5)

To determine the regions of agreement ΩA and disagreement ΩD, we first need to determine
the set of parameters {a1 , a2 }  R 2 over which the two Stackelberg solutions with either controller
as leader exist. It follows (from Eqs. (48)-(53) in [88] ) that the open-loop Stackelberg solution
with P1 as leader exists provided {a1 , a2 }  R 2 satisfy:
(1 + a2 )  0 

(1 + a2 ) 2 + a1  0 

(3.6)

The control variables for this solution are

40

u1s1 = −

a (1 + a )
a1
xo and u2 s1 = 2 2 2 xo
2
(1 + a2 ) + a1
(1 + a2 ) + a1

(3.7)

and the corresponding cost functions for the two controllers are:

c1
1
1 c2 (1 + a1 )3
2
1
J =
xo and J 2 =
x2
2
2
2 o
2 (1 + a2 ) + a1
2 [(1 + a2 ) + a1 ]
1
1

(3.8)

Similarly, the open-loop Stackelberg solution with P2 as the leader exists provide
{a1 , a2 }  R 2 satisfy:

1 + a1  0



(1 + a1 ) 2 + a2  0 

(3.9)

The control variables for this solution are:

u1s 2 = −

a2
a1 (1 + a1 )
xo
xo and u2 s 2 =
2
(1 + a1 ) 2 + a2
(1 + a1 ) + a2

(3.10)

and the corresponding cost functions for the two controllers are:

J12 =

c2
1
1 c1 (1 + a1 )3
2
xo2
x 2 and J 2 =
2
2
2 o
2 (1 + a1 ) + a2
2 [(1 + a1 ) + a2 ]

(3.11)

Thus, the parameter space  R2 over which both Stackelberg solutions exist is:

 = {a1 , a2 }  R 2  a1  0, a2  0, (1 + a1 )  0, (1 + a2 )  0, (1 + a1 ) 2 + a2  0, and (1 + a2 ) 2 + a1  0
Figure (3.3) shows the region Ω in R2. Note that the reason the coordinate axes correspond
to a1 = 0 and a2 = 0 are shown as dotted lines is that these lines are not included as a part of Ω.
Next, we need to determine the region of agreement  A   . As mentioned earlier, ΩA
consists of two sub-regions  A1 = 1L   2F where both controllers agree that C1 should be selected
as the leader and  A2 = 1F   2L where both controllers agree that C2 it should be selected as
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leader. The region 1L is determined by the set of parameters that yield J11  J12 . Using (3.8) and
(3.11), this means that:

Figure (3.4): Feasible Region Ω (shown in color)

c1
c1 (1 + a1 )3

[(1 + a2 ) 2 + a1 ] [(1 + a1 ) 2 + a2 ]2
After numerous algebraic manipulations, the above inequality reduces to:

c1 (1 + a1 ) 4 + 2a2 (1 + a1 ) 2 + a22 − ((1 + a1 )3[(1 + a1 ) + 2a2 + a22 ]  0

(3.12)

(3.13)

and after additional manipulations, it reduces further to:

c1 2a2 (1 + a1 ) 2 + a22 − a2 (2 + a2 )(1 + a1 )3   0

(3.14)

and finally, after more manipulations, it simplifies to
−2c1a1a2 (1 + a1 ) 2 − c1a1a22 ((2 + a1 ) + (1 + a1 ) 2 )  0
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(3.15)

Dividing the above inequality by the expression c1a1a22 (1 + a1 ) 2 which is > 0 since c1a1 = c12c p yields
the condition:

(2 + a1 )
2
(3.16)
+1+
0
a2
(1 + a1 ) 2
Now, if a2  0 (i.e., if c2  0 ) then the above inequality (4.16) will always be satisfied when

{a1 , a2 } . If a2  0 then (4.16) must also be satisfied to characterize 1L . Thus, in summary, the
set of parameters for which C1 prefers to be the leader is:



 
(2 + a1 )
2
1L = {a1 , a2 }    ( a2  0 ) or  a2  0 and
+1+

0
(3.17)
 
a2
(1 + a1 ) 2


 
and the set of parameters for which C1 prefers to be a follower is 1F =  − 1L . Figure (3.4)
illustrates the division of  into 1L and 1F .
Now following a similar derivation, the set  2L such that J 22  J 21 can be determined as:


2
 
(2 + a2 )
2L = {a1 , a2 }    ( a1  0 ) or  + 1 +

0
if
a

0
(3.18)
 
1
(1 + a2 ) 2

 a1
 
and  2F =  −  2L . Figure (3.5) illustrates the division of  into  2L and  2F . The
superposition of Figures (3.4) and (3.5) when  it is bounded by a1  A and a2  A and A = 2 is
shown in Figure (3.6). This figure shows the two regions of agreement (  A1 and A2 ) and the
two regions of disagreement (  D1 and D2 ). It is interesting to note that the feasible region is now
divided into eight separate regions (labeled I through VIII for ease of referencing) that are related
to the allocation of roles between the two controllers as follows:
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Figure (3.5): Regions 1L and 1F in Ω

1)  A1 It consists of sub-regions I and II, where both agree that C1 should be selected as a leader.
2) A2 It consists of sub-regions III and IV, where both agree that C2 should be selected as a
leader.
3)  D1 It consists of sub-regions V, VI, and VII, where both disagree, each preferring itself to be
selected as a leader.
4) D2 It consists of sub-region VIII, where both disagree, each preferring the other controller to
be elected as leader.
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Note that  A1 and A2 each consists of a large and a small region that is disconnected,
while  D1 consists of three disconnected regions with VII being dominant in size, indicating that
most solutions would result in each controller wanting itself to be selected as leader.

Figure (3.6): Regions  2L and  2F in Ω

When the upper bound A of the parameters a1 and a2 changes, some of the above
observations will change accordingly. For example, when A=0 (i.e., when  is bounded by

a1  0 and a2  0 ), it will follow that  D1 will no longer exist, leaving only three possible options

45

with D2 being the most dominant indicating a strong preference for solutions where both
controllers prefer the other controller be selected as leader.
Finally, solutions that correspond to parameters in the small regions (e.g., II and IV) are
very sensitive to small perturbations in the parameters causing a wrong potential distribution of
roles for the controllers.

Figure (3.7): Characterization of  A1 , A2 ,  D1 and D2 in Ω
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3.4 Probabilities of Occurrence
Assuming that the parameters a1 and a2 are uniformly distributed over,  as shown in
Figure (3.3) with A as upper bounds a1 and a2 , we can calculate the probabilities of occurrence of
solutions where both agreement and disagreement occur. The total area of the region Ω in Figure
(3.4) can be determined analytically as a function of A by direct integration to be equal to

(A + 1) 2 −

5 5 −7
= A2 + 2 A + 0.30328 . Tables (3.1) and (3.2) list the areas calculated by direct
6

integration for each of the various regions in figure (3.6) for three different values of A. These
tables also show the probability of occurrence of solutions corresponding to all sub-regions
individually as well as to the cumulative regions representing agreement and disagreement.

Table (3.1): Probabilities of Occurrence of all individual Sub-regions within 
Type of
Region
Solution

Area of Region
A=0-

A=

5 −1

A=1

Probability of Occurrence
A=2

A=0-

2

 A1

A2

 D1

D2

A=

5 −1

A=1

A=2

2

I

0.0

0.5227

0.9047

1.9047

0.0%

27.20%

27.39% 22.94%

II

0.0526

0.0526

0.0526

0.0526

17.34%

2.74%

1.59%

III

0.0

0.5227

0.9047

1.9047

0.0%

27.20%

27.39% 22.94%

IV

0.0526

0.0526

0.0526

0.0526

17.34%

2.74%

1.59%

V

0.0

0.3820

1.0000 4.00000

0.0%

19.88%

30.27% 48.17%

VI

0.0

0.0953

0.0953

0.0953

0.0%

4.96%

2.89%

1.15%

VII

0.0

0.0953

0.0953

0.0953

0.0%

4.96%

2.89%

1.15%

VIII

0.1981

0.1981

0.1981

0.1981

65.32%

10.32%

5.99%

2.39%

0.3033

1.9213

3.3033

8.3033

Total Area
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0.63%

0.63%

Table (3.2): Cumulative Probabilities of Occurrence of Agreement/Disagreement Regions
Region

Area of Region
A=0-

A=

5 −1

A=1

Probability of Occurrence
A=2

A=0-

2

A=

5 −1

A=1

A=2

2

 A1

0.0526

0.5753

0.9573 1.9573 17.34%

29.94%

28.98% 23.57%

A2

0.0526

0.5753

0.9573 1.9573 17.34%

29.94%

28.98% 23.57%

 D1

0.0

0.5726

1.1906 4.1906

29.80%

36.05% 50.47%

D2

0.1981

0.1981

0.1981 0.1981 65.32%

10.32%

5.99%

Area

0.3033

1.9213

3.3033 8.3033

0.0%

2.39%

Clearly, for a large parameters space (A=2), the dominant region with the highest overall
probability of occurrence is  D1 . This means that there is a 50.47% probability that both
controllers will end up disagreeing that C1 should be selected as a leader. This probability,
however, decreases rapidly to 36.05% as the parameter space becomes smaller (A=1) and to 0%
as space becomes even smaller (A=0 -). The probability of occurrence of an agreement-solution

 A1 or A2 is 0% when A=0 -, becomes equal to the probability of disagreement  D1 at about 30%
for each  A1 ,  A2 and D1 when A =

5 −1
then increases to 28.98% when A=1 and then
2

dropping substantially to 23.57% when A=2. Clearly, the highest probability of agreement (at
59.88%) occurs when A =

5 −1
and the highest probability of disagreement (at 65.32%) occurs
2

when A=0 -. The size of the parameter space is clearly the determining factor of whether a mutual

48

agreement can be reached D1 →  between the two controllers. Note that if A →  then and the
probability of disagreement with each controller wanting to be the leader will approach 100%.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have explored the problem of selecting the leader in Stackelberg
games with uncertain parameters. We have shown that the parameter space can be divided into
four regions, two of which representing games in which mutual agreement can be reached on the
selection of leader and the other two representing games in which disagreement between the
controllers takes place with both controllers either wanting to be leaders or both preferring to be
followers. A leader's selection can be easily accomplished if the game parameters fall within the
region of agreement. However, if they do not, then a stalemate condition may prevail, and the
selection of a leader becomes more complicated. The Nash solution or the possibility of side
payments may become options to break the stalemate. The probabilities of occurrence of
agreement and disagreement games are very useful information for the controllers to use in the
process of negotiations. We have illustrated these concepts with two examples and showed how
the probabilities of occurrence of all games are determined when the parameters are uniformly
distributed over a bounded space. This chapter provides an illustration of the type of analysis that
needs to be performed on all Stackelberg games defined over uncertain parameters where the
leader is to be selected by mutual agreement or negotiation and between the two controllers.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
ECONOMIC APPLICATION: DUOPOLIST CASE
This chapter is devoted to the important application of multiple controllers with multiple
objective systems in economics. We consider the real case when there are two-firm that control
the dynamics of a demand function. We derive the necessary condition for Leader-Follower-Firm
economic Stackelberg control systems. The general results are not easy to solve. In this work we
proposed the novel demand linear differential state function with quadratic cost functions.
However, the presence of cross term in the integrating profits function. The derivation of the
necessary conditions for such systems are presented in this chapter. To demonstrate the important
of the proposed model, the results, simulation results are presented for the numerical example.
4.1 Problem Description
A control system with two controllers, one labeled as a leader whose control is uL (t ), and
the other labeled as follower whose control is u F (t ), which is typically described by the differential
equation over an interval of time [0, T ] of the form:
dx(t )
= x = f ( x(t ), uL (t ), uF (t ))
dt

(4.1)

where x(t ) is the state variable. For simplicity of notation and without loss of generality,
we will consider only scalar systems, although most of the derivations can easily be extended to
higher dimensions. We will assume that the two controllers have two different discounted
objective functions (profits) that they wish to maximize:
T

J L (uL , uF ) =  e− rt LL ( x, uL , uF )dt
0
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(4.2)

T

J F (uL , uF ) =  e− rt LF ( x, uL , uF )dt

(4.3)

0

− rt

Where e is the discounted factor, and

r is the discounted rate for both firms.

To best describe the Stackelberg Leader-Follower control design process, we will consider
a specific model of a dynamic economic system of two controlling firms. This model describes
two firms controlling a common dynamically evolving market through their product supply
functions. The model that we will consider assumes that the product price x(t) (i.e., state variable)
depends on the total product supply u(t ) = uL (t ) + uF (t ) where u L (t ) is the leader supply control
and u F (t ) is the follower supply control according to the differential equation:
dx(t )
= x = f ( x(t ), uL (t ) + uF (t ))
dt

(4.4)

This relationship essentially implies that at any instant of time, the product price depends
on the total supply according to:
t

x(t ) = x0 +  f ( x( ), uL ( ) + uF ( ))d

(4.5)

0

Where x0 is the initial price at some arbitrary initial time t0 = 0 . Furthermore, we shall
assume that the objective of each firm is to maximize its profits over the time horizon [0, T ] , which
are now described as:
T

J L (uL , uF ) =  e − rt [ xuL − CL (uL )].dt

(4.6)

0

and
T

J F (uL , uF ) =  e − rt [ xuF − CF (uF )].dt
0

51

(4.7)

where the term xuI − CI (uI ) represents the difference between the revenues xuI and
production costs C I (u I ) for firms I =  L and F  . In this dynamic control model, the supply
control functions are determined continuously as a function of time to maximize the profits over
the specified time horizon.
The Stackelberg control of the leader is first determined as a function of the control of the
follower. To do this, the leader controller must anticipate the follower's maximization problem
(4.7) for every possible leader control to arrive at its control function. This is accomplished by the
follower controller using a standard optimal control methodology[1, 121-124]. The Hamiltonian
for the follower is defined (consider the discount factor for both firms is r = 0 ) as:

H F = xuF − CF (uF ) + F f ( x, uL + uF )

(4.8)

and the necessary conditions for the follower’s control function are [27]:

F = −uF − F

0= x−

f ( x, uL + uF )
, F (T ) = 0
x

C (uF )
f ( x, uL + uF )
+ F
uF
uF

(4.9)
(4.10)

Where F is the follower’s Lagrange-multiplier. Thus, for every possible control u L that the
leader can implement, the follower will determine its control u F by solving (4.9) and (4.10) where

x and H F satisfy (4.4) and (4.8). These expressions, therefore, define how the follower reacts to
every possible control choice by the leader. Now the problem faced by the leader is a little more
complex. The leader must determine its control u L that maximizes (4.6) subject to the constraint
that u F satisfies the differential equation (4.9), and the algebraic equation (4.10) can be solved
implicitly for the follower’s control as a function of x and the leader’s control u L ; that is,
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u F = u F (u L , x ) .

Then, the leader’s control can be determined using a different leader’s

Hamiltonian defined as:

f ( x, uL + uF (uL , x)) 
H L = xuL − CL (uL ) + L f ( x, uL + uF (uL , x))+ L  −uF (uL , x) − F

uF



the

And

necessary

conditions

for

the

leader’s

control

function

 f ( x, uL + uF ) f ( x, uL + uF ) uF 
 uF
 2 f ( x, u L + u F )
L = −L 
+
+ F
 + L 
x
uF
x 
uF x

 x
 2 f ( x, uL + uF ) uF 
+
L (T ) = 0
 − uL ,
uF2
x 

L = −
0=

H L
f ( x, uL + uF )
= L
,  L (0) = 0
F
uF

(4.11)
become:

(4.12)

(4.13)

 f ( x, uL + uF ) f ( x, u L + u F ) u F 
H L
C (u )
= x − L L + L 
+

uL
uL
uL
uF
uL 

 u  2 f ( x, uL + uF )  2 f ( x, u L + u F ) u F 
− L  F +
+

uF uL
uF 2
uL 
 uL

(4.14)

These expressions are, in general, very difficult to solve. However, like many of the
optimal control problem, a solution can be determined analytically in the case where the system is
linear and the cost functions are quadratic. This will be discussed in detail in the next section.
4.2 The Case of Linear Demand and Quadratic Cost Function
The special case of one controller linear system and quadratic cost functions has received
considerable interest in the control literature since the 1970s [122, 123]. As in the one controller
case, considerable insight can be obtained about the system behavior by analyzing this special linear
quadratic two-controller case. Let the system dynamics in (4.4) be linear and described as follows:
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(4.15)
x = ax − b(uL + uF )
x(0) = x0
Where a and b are positive constants and representing the rate of growth of the state
variable when no control is applied. Similarly, let the cost functions in (4.6) and (4.7) be quadratic
of the form:
1
1
(4.16)
cLuL2 and CF (uF ) = cF uF2
2
2
Where cL and cF are positive constants, and the factor ½ is introduced for mathematical
CL (uL ) =

convenience. It is clear from (1) that the two controllers can keep the state variable constant x0
throughout the entire time horizon [87] if they both reach a consensus to simultaneously adjust their
controls so that uL + uF = (a b) x . However, this is unlikely to happen since if one controller
increases its control supply to increase its profits, the other controller will have to reduce its control
to keep the consensus resulting in a reduction in its profits, which may not be acceptable. In the
dynamic model described in (4.15), both controllers will continuously adjust their controls in order
to maximize their objective functions. Thus, the follower’s maximization problem as described in
(4.4), (4.8)-(4.10) will have a Hamiltonian in the form:
1
H F = xuF − cF uF2 + F ( ax − b ( uL + u F ) )
2
As well as the following necessary conditions:
x = ax − b ( u L + u F )

x (0) = x0

F = −u F − aF , F (T ) = 0

0 = x − cF uF − bF

(4.17)

(4.18)
(4.19)
(4.20)

Thus, from(4.20), we have

uF =

1
( x − bF )
cF
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(4.21)

As a result, the problem faced by the leader is to maximize (4.7)subject to the two
constraints:

b
b2
x = (a − ) x − buL + F , x(0) = x0
cF
cF

(4.22)

And

b
1
)F − x, F (T ) = 0
(4.23)
cF
cF
Derived from (4.18) and (4.19) by replacing u F as described in (4.21). The corresponding

F = −(a −

Hamiltonian (4.11) becomes:



1
b
b2
b
1 
H L = xuL − cLuL2 + L  (a − ) x − buL + F  +  L  −(a − )F −
x
2
cF
cF
cF
cF 




(4.24)

And the necessary conditions (4.12)-(4.14) reduce to:

L = −uL − (a −
L = −

b
1
)L +  L ,
cF
cF

L (T ) = 0

b2
b
L + (a − )  L ,  L (0) = 0
cF
cF
0 = x − cLuL − bL

(4.25)
(4.26)
(4.27)

From (4.27) we have:

uL =

1
( x − bL )
cL

(4.28)

Now combining equations,(4.22)-(4.23) and (4.28) and replacing the controls u F and u L
with their expressions in (4.21) and (4.28), we get:

x = (a −

b b
b2
b2
− ) x + L + F
cL cF
cL
cF

x(0) = x0

b b
1
1
− )L − x +  L , L (T ) = 0
cL cF
cL
cF
b
1
F = −(a − )F − x, F (T ) = 0
cF
cF

L = −(a −
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(4.29)
(4.30)
(4.31)

with β L satisfying equations(4.26). Now, introducing the transformations L = kL x ,

F = k F x , and  L = kx ; and after considerable mathematical manipulations, the solution of these
equations yields the following control functions for the leader and follower respectively:

1
(4.32)
(1 − bkL ( t ) ) (t ) x0
cL
1
uF (t ) = (1 − bk F ( t ) )  (t ) x0
(4.33)
cF
where kL (t ), kF (t ), and  (t ) are functions of time that satisfy the following differential
uL (t ) =

equations:

2b 2b 
b2 2
b2
1
1
k L ( t ) =  −2a +
+
k
t
−
k
t
−
k L ( t ) k F ( t ) + k (t ) − ,
k L (T ) = 0
 L( )
L ( )
cL c F 
cL
cF
cF
cL


b 2b 
b2
b2 2
1
k F ( t ) =  −2a + +
k
t
−
k
t
k
t
−
k F ( t ) − , k F (T ) = 0
 F( )
L( ) F ( )
cL cF 
cL
cF
cF


(4.34)
(4.35)

and where k (t ) satisfies

k (t ) =

b
b2
b2
b2
k ( t ) − ( k L ( t ) + k F ( t ))k (t ) − k L (t )
cL
cL
cF
cF

k (0) = 0

(4.36)

t

 ( )d
and  (t ) = e 0

where:



 (t ) =  a −



b b2
b b2
+ kL ( t ) −
+ kF ( t ) 
cL cL
cF c F


(4.37)

At this point, we should mention that equations (4.34)-(4.36) are a two-point boundary value
problem consisting of coupled nonlinear differential equations. Equations (4.34) and (4.35) have
boundary conditions at the terminal time t=T, while equation (4.36) has a boundary condition at the
initial time t=0. Once this system of equations is solved for k L (t ) , k F (t ) and k (t ) , only k L (t ) and

k F (t ) are used to generate the function  (t ) in (4.37), which in turn is used to calculate the function

 (t ) .
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4.3 Illustrative Example
As an illustrative example, we consider a control system model of a dynamic market with
two firms producing and selling the same product. The model would follow the differential
equation (4.15) and profit functions as described in (4.6) and (4.7) with production costs as
described in (4.16). Let the problem parameters be defined as follows: a = 0.03 , b = 0.012 ,

cL = 0.60 and cF = 0.70 , and let the time horizon be such that T = 30 . Assuming that the product
has an initial unit price x0 = 10 , plots of the functions k L (t ) k F (t ) , and k (t ) that satisfy (4.34)(4.36) are shown in Figures (4.1) and (4.2), respectively. Plots of the control functions u L (t ) and

u F (t ) are shown in figure (4.3), and a plot of the state variable x(t ) , which represents the product
price, is shown in Figure (4.4). The total profits accumulated by the firms in this case over the entire
time horizon are J L = 2,843.70 and J F = 2, 471.31 indicating that the firm that has lower production
costs has achieved higher profits
Clearly, figure (4.3) shows that in the case of both firms, to maximize their profits, they
must continuously increase production over the entire time horizon. Also, it appears that the leader
firm whose production cost is lower seems to be producing at a higher rate than the follower firm
whose production cost is higher. A close examination of the figure (4.4) reveals that the product
price increases rapidly at the beginning but reaches a peak of almost 12 around t=20 before tapering
down to 11.5 at t=30., the end of the profit maximization horizon.
One interesting aspect of this analysis is to examine the profits of both firms and the product
price as a function of the follower’s production cost. Table (4.1) and Figures (4.4-4.5) show the
variations of the profits of both firms and the price behavior overtime when the Leader’s cost
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parameter is fixed cL = 0.60 , and the follower cost parameter c F is increased from 0.50 to 1.2.
Clearly, as the follower's production costs increase, the product price increases and the follower’s
profits decrease, but the leader’s profits increase. Thus the leader has an incentive to ensure that
the follower’s production costs remain as high as possible. In fact, when the follower’s production
costs are double those of the leader, i.e. cF = 1.20 , the leader’s profits will be double the profits of
the follower. Table 1 also shows that, when cF = 0.58128 , both firms accomplish the same profits

J L = J F = 2,761.20 . It is also interesting to note that the product price behavior as a function of
time changes markedly as a function of c F . The lower c F , the more the price tends to reach a peak
value. This peak value shifts to later in time as c F increases and vanishes when cF = 1.00 . Beyond
this value, the price becomes monotonically increasing in time. This type of price behavior is
interesting from the consumer point of view. A price that exhibits a peak followed by a drop after
a certain time is more favorable to the consumer leading to the conclusion that the consumer prefers
that the follower firm's production costs be more on par with the costs of the leading firm. In the
next section, some results will be presented for the sensitivity of the parameters variation in the
proposed model and their corresponding effects on the profits for the two firms.
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Figure (4.1): Plots of functions k L (t ) and k F (t ) of equations(4.34) and (4.35)

Figure (4.2): Plots of function k (t ) , equation (4.36)
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Figure (4.3): plots of u L (t ) and u F (t ) production rates

Figure (4.4): plot of x(t ) production price
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Table (4.1): Profits of both firms as a function of c F when cL = 0.60

cF

JL

JF

0.50

2708.14

3008.48

0.52

2720.50

2943.00

0.54

2733.40

2880.72

0.56

2746.72

2821.38

0.58

2760.32

2764.74

0.58128

2761.20

2761.20

0.6

2774.11

2710.58

0.62

2788.02

2658.73

0.64

2801.97

2609.01

0.66

2815.93

2561.29

0.68

2829.85

2515.43

0.70

2843.70

2471.31

1.00

3032.24

1963.00

1.20

3134.67

1729.25
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Figure (4.5): plot of x(t ) when cL = 0.6 and c F is increased from 0.50 to 1.20.
4.4 Sensitivity with parameter variation of the demand function
Following the results, we have gotten in chapter three and applied to the proposed model
and results of the duopolistic. If we suppose that uncertainty happen s in the demand function
parameters, i.e., changing in a and 𝑏.
First, supposing there is an uncertain value of a around its nominal value, with a fixed
value of 𝑏, the plot in figure (4.6) shows proportional relations between the a and both firms’
profits. Whereas a = 0.024 which is 80% from its nominal value a = 0.03 , the leader firm will
have profit J = 2298 which is around 80% from its profit when a is nominal, and on another
L

side, follower firm J F = 1582 which is 64.7% almost the same percentage of losses. Thus, as the
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value of a going up to +20%, 𝑎 = 0.036 , the profits for leader and follower increased by +29%
and+30% , respectively.

Figure (4.6): Firms’ profits vs. a fixed b = 0.012 .

The other possibility is that change in b ’s value with fixed a . If the variation 𝑏 is ranging
as follow: {−20% → +20%} from its nominal value, both firms' profits decrease as follows:
Leader {+13 → −10%} while the follower will change {+13.5% → −11%} . Figure (4.7) shows the
full range for the above b ’s variation and the firms’ profits' corresponding effects.
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Figure (4.7): Firms’ profits vs. b and fixed a = 0.03 .

From the above two possibilities, both firms’ profits will increase as the value a increases
and decreases. As the final possible if both parameters are varying 20% , the 3-dimensional plot
in figure (4.8) shows the relationship as ( a, b ) pair are change and outcome leader firm profit J L
. As expected from the previous results, the possible upper value of a combined with the lowest
possible of b the best profit of leader firm within the range of variations and vice-versa.
Numerically speaking, as shown from the figure (4.8) the lowest possible value for the leader profit

J L (a = 0.024, b = 0.0216) = 2631 and best possible value is J L (a = 0.036, b = 0.0144) = 5554
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Figure (4.8) Leader firm profits versus a and b variation

For the same range of variations for the demand function parameters, the profits changes are
represented by the surface, as shown in figure (4.9). The results can be shown for the lowest and
best values of the follower profit as follow: J F (a = 0.024, b = 0.0216) = 1507 and best possible
value is J F (a = 0.036, b = 0.0144) = 3384
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Figure (4.9): Follower firm profits versus a and b variation

4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we considered control systems controlled by two independent controllers.
Motivated by real problems in dynamic economics where more powerful big firms can implement
their production strategies before the less powerful small firms, the leader-follower structure as a
variation of the traditional control systems has attracted considerable attention in recent years. In
such systems, due to either size or power, one controller has an advantage over the other in that it
is capable of designing and implementing its control actions before the other. This controller is
referred to as the leader controller and the other as the follower controller. To take advantage of the
leadership role, the leader controller anticipates the follower controller's reaction and designs its
control actions taking this reaction into account as a constraint that needs to be satisfied. This makes
the design process of the leader control much more complicated than the follower control design.
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Once the leader’s control is designed and implemented, the follower control is traditionally
designed as an optimal one controller control. In this chapter, we have examined the design process
of both controllers in detail, and we have shown that the leader implicitly determines the best
follower’s control that optimizes its performance and designs its control taking into account that the
follower’s optimal choice is that specific control. These types of leader-follower control systems
can be used to describe many practical control systems. An illustrative example and simulation
results are presented to demonstrate the our proposed differential demand function with using
Stackelberg framework in such applications.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
The control of multi-controller multi-objective systems presented in this dissertation is
considered a natural extension of the standard optimal control theory. In this dissertation, we have
discussed properties and applications related to these types of systems. The focus of the
dissertation is on dynamic systems with two controllers, each having its own objective function to
minimize over a finite-horizon. The contributions of the dissertation are summarized below.
5.1 Contributions
5.1.1 Sampled closed-loop
Chapter two proposed a sampled, instead of continuous, closed -loop schemes for twocontroller multi-objective systems. The necessary conditions for the proposed approach are
derived in detail for Linear Quadratic (LQ) systems. The theoretical results and implementation of
the sampled closed loop controls are applied for both Nash, and Stackelberg approaches. The main
consideration of this approach is in designing the controls, which is a trade-off between the
simplicity of implementation of the open-loop framework and the robustness property of the
closed-loop framework. The proposed scheme can be a special type of feedback loops that are
closed only at specific instants of time when the state-vector is available for measurement. As an
application for the derived results, we have illustrated a two-controller example for both the Nash
and Stackelberg solutions where the time horizon is divided into several number of samples.
Several observations can be made as a result of this example. For the Nash controllers it was
observed that as the number of samples increased, the system's behaviors for both controllers and
state trajectory resemble the behavior of the continuous closed loop. However, the sampled68

closed-loop Stackelberg implemented controller with a high rate of samples approached the Nash
continuous closed-loop controls, and state trajectory.

5.1.2 Chosen Roles with Parameters uncertainty

Chapter four is devoted to an application of two controller systems in economics, the
duopoly model. This model is a linear differential price equation while the profit functions include
quadratic costs. In this chapter, we presented an illustrative example and derived the necessary
conditions for the leader-follower Stackelberg approach. One can conclude that the solution does
not exist for all possible ranges of cost parameters.

5.1.3 Economic Application: Duopolist Case
Chapter four is devoted to one important application in economic, the duopoly case. The literature
for two-firm shares the same market and produces the same good and control the demand function
is mostly static. However, this dissertation tries to consider the price as controlled by a differential
equation from a control system view. The proposed model is new and has not been considered in
previous literature. This model is a linear differential price equation while the profit functions are
quadratic cost and have a cross term. However, due to the fact that the Nash controller’s derivation
is more straightforward than the Stackelberg controller, the Nash case is not considered in this
work. An illustrative example is presented to apply the necessary derived conditions for such
systems using the leader-follower Stackelberg approach. One can conclude that the solution does
not exist for all possible ranges of cost parameters.
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5.2 Suggestions for Future Research
There are several interesting problems that have not been explored in this dissertation and
remain open for future research. An important problem is to extend the sampled closed loop
approach to multiple controllers in nonlinear systems. Another problem is generalizing the leaderfollower role assignment over system parameters distribution for more general models including
linear quadratic systems.

Exploring the possible solutions when both controllers are in

disagreement would also be interesting.
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